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The paper studies the role of communication in facilitating collu-
sion. The situation of inﬁnitely repeated Cournot competition in the
presence of antitrust enforcement is considered. Firms observe only
their own production levels and a common market price. The price
is assumed to have a stochastic component, so that a low price may
signal either deviations from collusive output levels or a ’downward’
demand shock. The ﬁrms choose between tacit collusion and collusion
with communication. Communication implies that the ﬁrms meet and
exchange information about past outputs and is assumed to be the
only legal proof of cartel behavior. The antitrust enforcement takes
the form of an exogenous probability to detect the meetings, in which
case the ﬁrms are sued for cartel behavior and pay a ﬁne. Tacit collu-
sion is assumed to provide no grounds for the legal action but involves
ineﬃciencies due to the lack of complete information about individual
output levels. It is shown that there exists a range of discount factors
where collusion with communication constitutes the most proﬁtable
collusive strategy.
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11 Introduction
The paper explores the role of communication in facilitating collusion in an
inﬁnite-horizon setting, where ﬁrms’ individual actions are private informa-
tion and each ﬁrm can make only statistical inference about the behavior
of its rivals. Communication is assumed to allow ﬁrms to share private in-
formation about their individual actions and thus helps sustain collusion.
This type of communication, however, may not be always beneﬁcial because
it often generates an incontestable proof of collusive behavior which can be
revealed by competition authorities (CA). In the situation where ﬁrms can
choose between tacit collusion and collusion with communication, the paper
shows that the most proﬁtable collusive strategy may involve communication
for a range of intermediate values of the discount factor.
The conventional economic analysis of collusive behavior implicitly as-
sumes that ﬁrms form a tacit agreement about each other’s actions1 based
on information which is commonly observed and readily available to every
party. Firms cannot sign any legal contract2 aimed to sustain collusion be-
cause it is per se prohibited, yet they may enforce a cartel agreement in the
context of an inﬁnitely repeated competition game. Tacit collusion thus im-
plies that there is no need for collusive ﬁrms to communicate and, therefore,
requires no explicit accounting of their actions.
In practice, however, there is a strong evidence that collusive ﬁrms do
communicate.3 Despite the fact that communication does not allow them
to legally sign a collusive contract, so that the sustainability of collusion
is still an issue, it has been found that they explicitly collude by holding
regular meetings and keeping records of each other’s actions. Thus, the role
of communication in collusion needs further clariﬁcation.
In their excellent study of the Sugar Institute Case, Genesove and Mullin
(2001) highlight the deﬁciencies in the classical theory of collusion and stress
the reasoning behind ﬁrms’ regular meetings. They ﬁnd that communica-
tion mainly serves two purposes. First, it enhances the eﬃciency of a cartel
outcome and, second what is more important, it strengthens the sustainabil-
ity of the cartel. In the latter case, communication facilitates detection of
cartel deviators and eliminates mistakes in establishing the fact of cheating.
The recent paper by Athey and Bagwell (2001) on price collusion with
private information about unit costs touches upon the issue of eﬃciency.
They ﬁnd that the optimal collusion scheme involves a sophisticated mech-
anism design aimed to elicit the true type of each ﬁrm and, thus, implies
1In other words, the ﬁrms agree once and forever on a particular equilibrium strategy
from the set of all possible equilibrium strategies of the supergame.
2For example, an agreement to set the monopoly price or collectively produce the
monopoly output every period would be legally prohibited.
3See, for example, the Commision decision on the choline chloride cartel (Case
COMP/E-2/37.533) or the citric acid cartel (Case COMP/E-1/36.604).
2communication. In particular, the paper shows that productive and pricing
eﬃciency necessarily requires consideration of asymmetric schemes:4 in or-
der to induce a high-cost ﬁrm to reveal its type truthfully and thus abstain
from making any sales “today” it should be promised a reward “tomorrow”.
This in turn implies that this ﬁrm should receive a higher market share
tomorrow provided that both ﬁrms are equally eﬃcient.
A potential advantage of communication is explored in Compte (1998)
and Kandori and Matsushima (1998). Both papers develop basically the
same model in which the actions of players are private information and each
player observes private and imperfect signals of its rivals’ past play. The
latter fact causes a serious diﬃculty for the sustainability of collusion: since
the players receive diverse information about past history of the play they
may end up having diﬀerent expectations about what might have happened.
Communication in such a setup allows the players to exchange information
of the private signals and thus aims to enhance the sustainability of collu-
sion. However, as the authors acknowledge, they are not able to characterize
the set of equilibria when there is no communication, and therefore to eval-
uate the potential beneﬁts which the players derive from communication in
collusion.
The focus of the present paper is on the role of communication in fa-
cilitating collusion. Following the approach of Green and Porter (1984), I
develop a model where ﬁrms’ individual outputs constitute private informa-
tion. Firms receive an imperfect signal about each other’s behavior through
the realization of the stochastic market price which is publicly observable.
The main obstacle for collusion comes from the fact that a low price may
signal either deviations from collusive output levels or a ’downward’ demand
shock. I modify the Green and Porter approach by allowing ﬁrms to hold
meetings and exchange private information about each ﬁrm’ past behavior
before they produce their outputs. Communication thus helps resolve con-
fusion about the past play. Despite the beneﬁts of communication, yet it is
not completely innocuous: cartel participants are under the constant threat
of legal prosecution because their meetings can be detected by competition
authorities, in which case they are sued and pay a ﬁne.
There are many cartel cases in which ﬁrms have been found to exchange
private information of their past outputs during cartel meetings. In the
Choline Chloride Case, for example, the Decision of the European Commis-
sion states (paragraph 69):
Whether the agreed actions were being accomplished in prac-
4However, in their paper Athey et al. (1997) develope a model with continuum of
cost types and study optimal symmetric schemes. Their main result is that if the cost
distribution function is log-concave then the parties may ﬁnd it more proﬁtable to sacriﬁce
eﬃciency beneﬁts by adopting the rigid-pricing scheme, i.e. in each period the ﬁrms
select the same price whatever their cost levels, and thus abandon per se communication
whatsoever.
3tice was regular checked. The parties agreed to meet every six
months to monitor, discuss and correct any problems. In these
follow-up meetings, the parties compared information on sales
actually made during the last period and discussed whether the
group’s goals were being achieved.5
As Kuhn (2001) notices, in the Green and Porter model the observation
of (dis)aggregate output(s) suﬃces to enhance the sustainability of collusion.
The present paper provides a formal analysis of the beneﬁts which ﬁrms
can derive from the exchange of private information in the presence of the
antitrust enforcement.
Contrary to Athey and Bagwell (2001), where ﬁrms share information
about the current period in order to increase the proﬁtability of collusion,
in the present model the purpose of communication is to establish compli-
ance with the collusive agreement and thus strengthen the sustainability of
collusion. Another diﬀerence is the nature of information transmitted dur-
ing a meeting. In their model individual cost types constitute a piece of
soft information and, therefore, its reference to the past has little, if any,
use for the collusive parties. Moreover, since such information has no direct
impact on ﬁrms’ current and future objectives, little can be done to elicit it
truthfully.
Similarly to Compte (1998) and Kandori and Matsushima (1998), in
the present model ﬁrms can communicate information about the past be-
havior. The diﬀerence, however, is that in their model ﬁrms exchange soft
information, while here they exchange hard information. Furthermore, in
contrast to their approach, it is possible to derive the best collusive strategy
when communication is absent and thus evaluate the potential beneﬁts of
communication for collusive ﬁrms.
The main assumption of the model is that ﬁrms have hard evidence
about private actions. There is a rationale behind the fact that a ﬁrm may
not be able to distort or forge its report about its past behavior because,
say, veriﬁcation of the report may be costless. For example, in the Choline
Chloride Case, it has been established that collusive ﬁrms veriﬁed the com-
mercially sensitive information through the European Trade Association for
the Chemical Sector (CEFIC). In other instances, it has been found that
collusive ﬁrms may resort to establishing interior auditing schemes at the
most senior levels of management to monitor individual volumes of sales,
as in the Vitamin Case,6 or they may ask an independent auditing com-
pany to perform a similar task. Taking this into account, the main question
the parties confront is whether to comply with the collusive agreement by
submitting a report about their past behavior.
5See the Commision Decision on Case COMP/E-2/37.533.
6See the Commision Decision on Case COMP/E-1/37.512.
4This type of communication, however, may leave incriminating evidence
of cartel behavior, which can be discovered by the CA.7 If the meeting is
detected, ﬁrms are sued and pay a ﬁne. In contrast, if they choose tacit
collusion then there is eventually no way to incriminate them for cartel be-
havior. Indeed, the main proof of ﬁrms’ engagement in cartels often comes
from revealed notes, faxes, e-mails and other records of meetings. Moreover,
there is a strong belief among CA oﬃcials that if ﬁrms collude tacitly, they
can never be summoned to the court because of the lack of hard incrim-
inating evidence. As the case-law shows, such as in the EU Wood Pulp
Case, pure economic reasoning has been often found not suﬃcient from a
jurisdictional point of view to accuse undertakings in collusive behavior.
Although tacit collusion has the advantage of involving no legal action
from the CA, it is not completely innocuous for collusive ﬁrms. Since indi-
vidual actions are only privately observable, they have to incur informational
costs in designing a collusive scheme. In particular, there is more scope for
deviations, which, in turn, makes tacit collusion more fragile.
First, ﬁrms may deviate openly, that is they may optimally respond
to the collusive output and, thereby, clearly reveal cheating. This type of
deviation is common to both tacit and explicit collusive schemes. Second,
ﬁrms may cheat in a hidden way, that is they may opt for a suboptimal
response to the collusive output in order to induce the likelihood of being
detected.
The analysis is based on the comparison of the best payoﬀs obtained,
correspondingly, in the tacit and explicit collusion schemes. It is found that
in choosing the most proﬁt a b l et y p eo fc o l l u s i o n ,ﬁrms face the following
tradeoﬀ. Without communication collusion always involves informational
costs due to imperfect knowledge of ﬁrms’ individual actions while with
communication collusive proﬁts are reduced because of the ﬁne imposed in
the event the meeting is detected. The central result of the paper is that as
long as the punishment for cartel behavior is not too large, there exists an
intermediate range of discount factors where collusion with communication
constitutes the best collusive strategy.
The intuition is as follows. In explicit collusion ﬁrms save on informa-
tional costs but always bear the risk of being ﬁned for illegal behavior. In
contrast, in tacit collusion ﬁrms are never exposed to legal punishment but
instead incur informational costs which can vary with the value of the dis-
count factor. In particular, when the discount factor is large, information
costs are absent because ﬁrms can deter all deviations and sustain perfect
collusion. When the discount factor is small, there are no information costs
either because in this case a cheating ﬁrm would prefer the open deviation.
7For example, in the Carbonless Paper Case, cartel meetings were convened under the
cover of the oﬃcial meetings of the trade association and during the course of investigation
the Commission received copies of the minutes of these meetings.
5It is thus only for intermediate values of the discount factor that informa-
tional costs may impede collusion and ﬁrms may face the tradeoﬀ in choosing
between the tacit and explicit collusion schemes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the
model and derives the optimal collusive scheme. Conclusions and some
policy implications are presented in Section 3.
2T h e M o d e l
Two risk-neutral ﬁrms with identical unit costs of production c produce a
homogeneous product and repeatedly compete àl aCournot.8 Following the
Green and Porter approach, it is assumed that the ﬁrms can observe only
their own production levels. They face a common market price which is
inversely related to the total industry output Qt = q1t + q2t. The price is
assumed to include some stochastic component and in order to simplify the
exposition I conﬁne to the linear price schedule with the intercept being a
random variable
e pt = a +e θt − Qt, (1)
where the shocks {e θt}∞
t=0 are identically and independently distributed across
the time. It is assumed that e θt takes on two values, e θt ∈ Θ = {−σ,σ}
with equal probabilities and its realization is not directly observed by the
ﬁrms. Let P(Q)={pL(Q),p H(Q)} denote the set of feasible price real-
izations given the total industry output Q, where pL(Q)=a − σ − Q and
pH(Q)=a+σ −Q. The ﬁrms are assumed to perfectly observe the realized
market price e pt ∈ P(q1t + q2t). Since a ﬁrm observes neither the output of
its rival nor the true value of e θ, it may face a nontrivial inference dilemma:
for some realizations of e p 9 it cannot infer with probability one what level
of output the other ﬁrm has supplied on the market. The fact that it is im-
possible to make precise inference about privately taken actions constitutes
the core problem for the sustainability of collusion. As it will be shown
later, the ﬁrms have to sacriﬁce eﬃciency beneﬁts in order to overcome this
informational gap.
The CA is assumed to have no information regarding the relevant eco-
nomic data of ﬁrms’ costs, consumer demand or market shares. Therefore
it cannot make any inference about market behavior from the mere price
observation. The only proof of cartel behavior is assumed to come from the
8A simillar analysis would hold in case of Bertrand competion with diﬀerentiated prod-
ucts, where demand realizations for each product are determined by a common stochastic
shock.
9In particular, it will be shown for the low-demand state realization pL.
6detection of ﬁrms’ meetings.10 In this setup, tacit collusion thus implies that
cartel participants can never be sued and ﬁned because of the lack of hard
incriminating evidence. In contrast, if the ﬁrms explicitly collude and the
meeting is discovered then the revealed evidence of exchange of information
about past outputs provides an incontestable proof of the illegal behavior.
The single period expected proﬁto fﬁrm i is deﬁned as
π
exp
it (qit,q jt)=( pexp(qit + qjt) − c)qit − K,
where j 6= i, K denotes ﬁxed costs of production and A ≡ a − c>0. It is
easy to verify that the Nash equilibrium implies





i ≡ πNash =
1
9
A2 − K for i =1 ,2.
To deﬁne the stage game G the following notation is employed. Ξ =
{C,N} is the set of decision choices common to both ﬁrms, where C and N
imply communication and no communication, respectively. P =[ 0 ,p max] is
the set of all feasible price realizations and S =[ 0 ,q max] is the set of output
levels common to both ﬁrms.
The timing of the game G is thus as follows.
Stage 1. Each ﬁrm i =1 ,2 takes a decision ζi ∈ Ξ about whether to
hold a meeting. After the decisions having been made, they are assumed
to be known to every party. The meeting takes place if and only if both
ﬁrms agree to communicate, i. e., ζ1 = ζ2 = C and implies that the ﬁrms
disclose their private output levels produced in the past.11 In the event of
no meeting, no information about past outputs is available.
Stage 2. Each ﬁrm i =1 ,2 chooses its output level qi ∈ S,t h es h o c ke θ
is realized and the market price e p ∈ P is publicly observed.
Stage 3. The CA audits the industry. If communication has taken place,
it ﬁnds the incriminated evidence with probability ρ in which case each ﬁrm
is ﬁned by the amount F,o t h e r w i s ei tﬁnds nothing and no ﬁne is imposed.
Stage 4. The payoﬀso fﬁrms are realized.
The ﬁrms are supposed to play an inﬁnitely repeated game G∞(δ) deﬁned
by the component game G and the discount factor δ ∈ (0,1). A strategy Σi
of ﬁrm i speciﬁes for each period of time t ≥ 0
(i) a decision variable ζit ∈ Ξ about the meeting at period t as a function
of both ﬁrms’ past decisions, the sequences of past prices and the ﬁrm’s own
past quantities:
10Here, the model abstracts from any reason to communicate other than to facilitate
collusion.
11Notice that in this setup the decision of whether to meet is equivalent to the decision
of whether to disclose private information because, by assumption, the ﬁrms cannot distort
their reports.
7ζit : Ξ2(t−1) × Pt−1 × St−1 → Ξ,
for t ≥ 1 and ζi0 is given,
(ii) an output qit ∈ S as a function of both ﬁrms’ past and current
decisions about communication, the sequences of past prices and the ﬁrm’s
own past quantities:
qit : Ξ2t × Pt−1 × St−1 → S,
for t ≥ 1 and qi0 is given.





it (qit,q jt) − ρF, if ζit = ζjt = C,
π
exp
it (qit,q jt), otherwise.
Denote Σit =( ζit,q it) then a strategy Σi of ﬁrm i is Σi =( Σi1,Σi2,...).
Each ﬁrm i =1 ,2 seeks to maximize the expected value of the discounted
sum of its one-period payoﬀs




To simplify the analysis, only fully symmetric equilibria are considered.






In what follows I will derive the best (symmetric) payoﬀs respectively for
tacit and explicit collusion. Finally, by comparing these payoﬀs, the optimal
collusive scheme is obtained.
2.1 Tacit collusion
Tacit collusion implies no meetings, i.e., ζ1t = ζ2t = N for any t ≥ 0,a n dt h e
objective of the ﬁr m si st oﬁn dt h em o s tp r o ﬁtable collusive strategy in this
case. The following assumption simpliﬁes the analysis and, in particular,
makes it easy to deﬁne the maximal punishment.
Assumption 1. K = 1
9A2 or πNash =0 .
It states that the minmax payoﬀ (which is 0 here) is sustained simply
by a reversal to the static Nash equilibrium.12
As it is proven in the Appendix, given that e θ is uniformly distributed, the
best collusive strategy Σ
nc is stationary and consists in sticking to a collusive
12Under this interpretation, Π
exp(q)=( p
exp(2q) − c)q − K constitutes the diﬀerence
between the proﬁt and the static Nash equilibrium proﬁt.
8output, qnc, as long as the realized price, e p, is consistent with the target,
P(2qnc)={pL(2qnc),p H(2qnc)}. In case of any detected deviation the ﬁrms
revert to the static Nash equilibrium forever. Formally, let ΣNash denote
the strategy when every period the ﬁrms play the static Nash equilibrium
then Σ
nc is deﬁned as follows.
(i) At t =0agree on some output qnc.
(ii) For any t ≥ 1 produce qnc if in the previous period the realized price
e p ∈ P(2qnc),o t h e r w i s ep l a yΣNash.
Note that the best collusive strategy diﬀers from the one obtained in
Green and Porter (1984) and Abreu, Pearce and Stachetti (1986, 1990).
Following their approach one might think that Σ
nc should specify a price
war (at least for some periods) whenever the realized price is low, i.e., e p =
pL(2qnc). Recall, however, that in their setting the support of possible price
realizations is independent on the output levels which implies that ﬁrms’
deviations are never detected. When the market price falls below some
“trigger price” the ﬁrms switch on the price war in order to prevent any
potential deviation. The principal diﬀerence from their setting is that the
support P(Q) of the realized market prices now depends on the output levels
and is itself determined in equilibrium. In the model under study, for some
output levels the ﬁrms can infer with probability one that cheating has
occurred and therefore deviations are partially detected. As a result, the
analogous strategy is not necessarily optimal.
Let V




nc = Πexp(qnc). As the Appendix shows, in order that Σ
nc
be an equilibrium strategy two types of no-deviation constraints must be
satisﬁed.
First, a ﬁrm may deviate openly and thus clearly reveal cheating. In
which case in the most proﬁtable deviation it best responds to the collusive
output qnc. Since any deviation is most eﬀectively deterred when the ﬁrms
resort to the worst available punishment, the no-open deviation constraint




z πexp(z,qnc) − Πexp(qnc)
i
≤ δΠexp(qnc). (ICopn)
T h el e f th a n ds i d eo fI C opn is a one-period gain from deviation while the
right hand side is the value of discounted losses from abandoning collusion
forever afterwards.
Second, a ﬁrm may cheat in a hidden way, that is it may produce the
output level that reduce the likelihood (down to 1
2, here) of detection of
cheating. As is well known for Cournot competition models, a cheating ﬁrm
tends to expand its output production. Thus, the intuition suggests (and it
is proven in the Appendix) that the most proﬁtable deviation should involve
9a suboptimal increase of output, rH(qnc), so that when the demand is high
the price level mimics the one of the low-demand state, i.e.,
rH(qnc): pH (rH(qnc)+qnc)= pL (2qnc).
Note that even when the ﬁrm produces rH(qnc), its deviation is revealed
if the low-demand state is realized. Since in the latter case the ﬁrms switch
on the punishment phase, the no-hidden deviation constraint takes the form:




In choosing between the open and hidden deviations a ﬁrm thus faces
the following tradeoﬀ. The gain from the hidden deviation is always lower
because a cheating ﬁrm suboptimally responds to the collusive output. How-
ever, the discounted value of the future losses from abandoning collusion is
also lower because its cheating is detected with probability 1
2 only.
The analysis so far implies that in tacit collusion the ﬁrms choose qnc




s.t. ICopn and IChdn hold.
(P1)
Before proceeding with the characterization of a solution to P1, note






while the suboptimal response is rH(qnc)=qnc+2σ.In both cases, a cheating
ﬁrm ﬁnds it proﬁtable to increase the output. An important point, however,
is that in the case of the hidden deviation the increase is determined by the
variance σ of the shock e θ.T h u s ,i f σ is large enough then the suboptimal
response can be very ineﬃcient, i.e., rH(qnc) can be far beyond z∗(qnc). In
which case the hidden deviation is no longer attractive and the corresponding
no-deviation constraint is per se irrelevant in program P1. To rule out such
situation, I make






The following proposition establishes a key property of the solution to
P1.
PROPOSITION 1. There exist b δ1 and b δ2 such that 0 < b δ1 < b δ2 < 1 and
IChdn is binding in program P1 for any δ ∈ (b δ1,b δ2).
Proof: see the Appendix.
10The proposition thus states that the no-hidden deviation constraint is
the relevant one for intermediate values of the discount factor. Intuitively,
the open deviation yields a large one-period gain but provides no possibility
to cheat in the future. In contrast, the hidden deviation yields a lower one-
period gain but induces the probability to repeatedly cheat in the future.
When the discount factor is small, a cheating ﬁrm values more the current
period proﬁt and thus ﬁnds the open deviation more proﬁtable. On the other
hand, when the discount factor is large, the ﬁrms can deter all deviations and
sustain the monopoly outcome. Hence, it is only for intermediate values of
the discount factor that the hidden deviation may weaken the sustainability
of tacit collusion.
The exact analytical expressions of b δ1 and b δ2 as functions of σ are found
to be complicated. To capture the impact of σ on b δ1 and b δ2 simulations
were performed. Two representative examples when A =1 0 , σ =0 ,1 and
σ =0 ,4 are shown on ﬁgures 1 and 2.
[Insert Figures 1 and 2 from the Appendix.]
The results conﬁrm the intuition. For low values of σ the gain from the
hidden deviation is small which implies that the hidden deviation is more
attractive only when qnc is close to qNash. This results to the narrow interval
(b δ1,b δ2) l o c a t e di nar a n g eo fs m a l lδ’s. As σ increases, the interval (b δ1,b δ2)
broadens and shifts to the right. Finally, as σ approaches its upper bound,
the interval (b δ1,b δ2) shrinks and gradually disappears.
In order to gain the intuition about the magnitude of the losses due
to imperfect information, consider the task of the collusive ﬁrms when the
individual outputs are observable. Clearl y ,i nt h i sc a s eo n l yo p e nd e v i a t i o n s





Since the analytical expressions of V
nc and V are complicated, I plot the
two-dimensional graph of 1− V
nc
V as a function of the discount factor δ and
the ratio σ
A.
[Insert Figure 3 from the Appendix.]
As ﬁgure 3 shows, for some range of parameters the ﬁrms can lose more
than 40% of their average intertemporal proﬁt due to the lack of perfect
information, i.e., when the no-hidden deviation constraint binds. In such
a case they have strong incentives to eliminate the informational gap by
means of communication.
2.2 Collusion with communication
Communication implies that the ﬁrms meet and exchange hard information
about past outputs. Since communication is costly, the ﬁrms should use it
11in the most eﬃcient way.
In particular, there is no use for a meeting at t =0 ,s i n c et h e r ei sn o t h -
ing to reveal yet. Similarly, for t ≥ 1 for some price realizations the ﬁrms
can detect deviations without communication. Indeed, if the ﬁrms agree to
produce qc at period t and the realized market price is not consistent with
the targeted price, i.e., e p/ ∈ P(2qc),t h e ni ti sc l e a re v e nwithout commu-
nication that cheating has occurred. Conversely, if the price level assigned
to the high demand state is realized, i.e., e p = pH(2qc), then one can in-
fer without communication that no deviation has occurred either, since the
hidden deviation that mimics the price assigned to the high demand state
is never proﬁtable.13 Thus it is only when e p = pL(2qc) that the ﬁrms are
uncertain about each other’s actions and may thus wish to communicate.
The most proﬁtable collusive strategy Σ
c with selective communication is
formally deﬁned as follows.
(i) At t =0do not meet, i.e. ζi0 = N, and produce some output qc.
(ii) For any t ≥ 1:
• if in period t − 1 the realized price is e pt−1 = pH(2qc),t h e ni np e r i o dt
do not meet, ζit = N and produce qc,
• if in period t − 1 the realized price is e pt−1 = pL(2qc),t h e ni np e r i o dt
attend a meeting, ζit = C,
• produce qc in period t if the meeting has taken place and disclosed
information is consistent with the collusive agreement, i.e., qjt−1 = qc,
• play ΣNash if the meeting has not taken place when it should or the
realized price is not consistent with the target, i.e., e p/ ∈ P(2qc) or the meeting
reveals that one ﬁrm has actually deviated.
Let VH and VL denote the expected present value of ﬁrm’s proﬁts given
that the previous period price realizations are pH and pL respectively. Since
the shock is uniformly distributed, one obtains





















c denote the payoﬀ associated with the strategy Σ
c. Since Σ
c pre-
scribes no meeting at t =0then V
c = VH and simple calculations show
that
V




13See the Appendix for a formal proof.
12Thus, when the ﬁrms collude explicitly, they earn lower proﬁts because
of the ﬁne imposed in the event the meeting is detected.
In order that the output qc be produced along an equilibrium path it
must be immune to all possible deviations. Note that any deviation is now
systematically detected14 and a ﬁrm may deviate in two ways: it may either
raise its output or wave the meeting.
Consider ﬁrst output deviations. A ﬁrm may cheat either in a period of
no meeting or after the meeting has taken place. In both cases the most
proﬁtable deviation implies that a cheating ﬁrm optimally responds to the
collusive output, qc, and the no-deviation constraint is thus the same
(1 − δ)Max
z πexp(z,qc) ≤ (1 − δ)Πexp(qc)+
1
2
δ (VH + VL),














By comparing ICopn and ICq, o n ec a ns e et h a tt h ed i s c o u n t e dv a l u eo ft h e
losses from abandoning collusion is lower when the ﬁrms collude explicitly.
This is because when collusion breaks down, the ﬁrms stop communicating
and hence are no longer exposed to the ﬁne.
Now, if a ﬁrm deviates by waving the meeting it saves on the expected
ﬁne. The no-deviation constraint in this case takes the following form:
0 ≤ (1 − δ)(Πexp(qc) − ρF)+
1
2
δ (VH + VL),
which is equivalent to








As ICq and ICmeet show, explicit collusion may not be sustained if the
cost of communication, i.e., the expected ﬁne, is too large. Therefore, I
make





This assumption states that the expected ﬁne must not exceed the max-
imal joint collusive proﬁt. As the Appendix shows, it ensures that there
exists a range of discount factors where the ﬁrms can collude with commu-
nication. Furthermore, in such a case the ICmeet constraint is never binding
and can thus be omitted.
14Cheating is either revealed by the current period price realization or during the next
period meeting.
13The analysis implies that in explicit collusion the ﬁrms choose qc that
solves the following program:
V
c(δ)=Max




The following proposition characterizes key properties of the solution to
P3.
PROPOSITION 2. There exist δ0
1 and δ0
2 such that 0 <δ 0
1 <δ 0
2 < 1 and
(i) as o l u t i o nt oP 3e x i s t so n l yi f δ ∈ [δ0
1,1),
(ii) ICq is binding in program P3 for any δ ∈ [δ0
1,δ0
2).
Proof: see the Appendix.
The proposition thus states that explicit collusion cannot be sustained for
small values of the discount factor. To gain the intuition of this result, recall
that in this case even without communication a sustainable collusive output
should be close to the static Nash equilibrium one. This implies that the
beneﬁts from collusion are small. Therefore if, in addition, communication is
costly then explicit collusion may either not be proﬁtable or not sustainable.
On the other hand, when the discount factor is large then, as before, the ﬁrms
can sustain the monopoly outcome. Hence, it is only for an intermediate
range of discount factors that ICq can be binding.
2.3 The optimal collusive scheme
This section derives the best collusive strategy. The analysis is based on the
comparison of the value functions V
nc(δ) and V
c(δ) deﬁned as the solutions,
correspondingly, to programs P1 and P3.
PROPOSITION 3. When ρF is not too large, then there exist an interval
∆ ⊆ (b δ1,b δ2) such that V
nc(δ) < V
c(δ) for any δ ∈ ∆.
In words, when the expected ﬁne is not too large then for some interme-
diate values of the discount factor the ﬁrms prefer collusion with communi-
cation to tacit collusion.
As this proposition is central to the paper, the proof is included in the
text. To begin, consider programs P1 and P2. Since the objective functions
in P1 and P2 coincide and the solution to P1 must satisfy an additional
constraint, i.e., IChdn, then it must be V
nc(δ) ≤ V (δ). Note that one can
have V
nc(δ) < V (δ) only when the IChdn constraint is binding. Therefore,
by applying proposition 1, one obtains
V
nc(δ)=V (δ) for any δ ∈ (0,b δ1] ∪ [b δ2,1), (2)
V
nc(δ) < V (δ) for any δ ∈ (b δ1,b δ2). (3)
14Consider now programs P2 and P3. Since the objective function in P3 is
lower than the one in P2 and the ICq constraint is stronger than the ICopn
constraint then it must be V
c(δ) < V (δ) for any ρF > 0. Note also that
ICq is a continuous function of ρF a n di nt h el i m i tw h e nρF tends to zero
ICq and ICopn coincide. Also, the objective function in P3 approaches Πexp
when ρF → 0. This implies that in the limit when ρF → 0 it must be that
V
c(δ) approaches V (δ). It then follows that for suﬃciently small values of
ρF one can make the diﬀerence between V
c(δ) and V (δ) as small as desired.
Given that V
nc(δ) is lower than V (δ) only for δ ∈ (b δ1,b δ2), there must exist
δ0 ∈ (b δ1,b δ2) such that V
nc(δ0) < V
c(δ0) when ρF is suﬃciently small. Since
V
c(δ) and V
nc(δ) are continuous functions, there must also exist an interval
∆ in the neighborhood of δ0 such that V
nc(δ) < V
c(δ) for any δ ∈ ∆. Finally,
(3) implies ∆ ⊆ (b δ1,b δ2). ¥
In order to illustrate the result of proposition 3, simulations were per-
f o r m e d . F i g u r e s4a n d5c o r r e s p o n dt ot h ec a s ew h e nA =1 0 , σ =0 .4,
ρF =0 .3 and ρF =1 .
[Insert Figures 4 and 5 from the Appendix.]
As ﬁgure 4 shows, when the expected ﬁne is suﬃciently large, the aver-
age intertemporal payoﬀ obtained in explicit collusion is always lower than
the one obtained in tacit collusion. If instead the value of the expected ﬁne
is reduced, the ﬁrms can obtain a higher payoﬀ in collusion with commu-
nication for some δ ∈ (b δ1,b δ2) as it is shown on ﬁgure 5. The simulations
thus conﬁr mt h ei n t u i t i o n .T h a ti s ,i nc h o o s i n gt h em o s tp r o ﬁt a b l et y p eo f
collusion the ﬁrms tradeoﬀ information costs associated with imperfect ob-
servation of individual outputs against communication costs associated with
the risk that the cartel is uncovered by the CA. Since information costs are
absent for small and large values of the discount factor then it is only for
some intermediate values of the discount factor the ﬁrms may prefer explicit
collusion to tacit one.
3C o n c l u s i o n
The paper shows that communication can help sustain collusion. While
there may be other reasons as for why collusive parties may want to meet,
I have focused on the case when communication allows the ﬁrms to resolve
uncertainty about past behavior. The analysis is based on the comparison
of two collusive schemes: with and without communication. In tacit col-
lusion the ﬁrms are hurt by the lack of complete information, whereas in
explicit collusion they face the risk of being ﬁned in the event the meet-
ing is uncovered by the CA. The main ﬁnding of the paper is that as long
as the punishment for illegal behavior is not too large, the optimal collu-
sive scheme involves communication, when prices are low, for some range of
discount factors.
15Though the analysis has been performed for the case of a single additive
stochastic shock, the results would be robust to alternative speciﬁcations of
uncertainty. For example, one may think of a diﬀerent probability distrib-
ution of the shock or multiple shocks which take on more than two values.
What is crucial for the results obtained is that in all such cases one still
maintains the assumption that communication eliminates uncertainty about
past behavior which in turn implies the same tradeoﬀ between informational
costs and a legal ﬁne.
The paper delivers some implications related to the cartel stability and
the antitrust policy to ﬁght collusion. Namely, it provides an economic
rationale behind the meetings held by collusive ﬁrms and emphasizes the
role of communication as a powerful mechanism to facilitate collusion. Used
as a means to resolve uncertainty about individual actions taken in the
past, it serves solely for the purpose of collusion. Finally, the paper suggests
the explanation of why the ﬁrms may prefer explicit collusion and care less
about the hard evidence left by the meeting. In the model under study, such
collusive strategy appears to be optimal only if the expected punishment for
cartel behavior is suﬃciently small.
APPENDIX
A The Best Collusive Strategy in Case of Tacit Collusion
In this section the best collusive strategy is derived when ﬁrms choose
tacit collusion. The proof is given for the case of symmetric (sequential)
equilibria.
In general, a strategy Σi for ﬁrm i is a sequence of functions that specify
an output production qit ∈ S at period t conditioning on ﬁrm i’s own past
outputs and past realizations of the random price e p ∈ P(q1 + q2).
Let U ∈ R+ denote the set of all symmetric (sequential) equilibrium
payoﬀs V nc of the game. U is nonempty because the strategy, ΣNash, that
speciﬁes playing the static Nash equilibrium outcome every period whatever
the history is, constitutes a (sequential) equilibrium.
Deﬁne V nc =i n fU and V
nc =s u pU.L e tΣ
nc and Σnc be the equilibrium
strategies that correspond to V
nc and V nc, respectively.
Note that the present setting diﬀers from the one developed by Abreu,
et. al. (1986, 1990) in that the support of the price realization depends on
ﬁrms’ actions. To illustrate the main problem in this case, suppose that in
the ﬁrst period in a sequential equilibrium the ﬁrms are to produce q.I fﬁrm
1 cheats and some price b p outside the support P(2q) is realized then ﬁrm 2
concludes that ﬁrm 1 has deviated but it cannot infer with probability one
what the other ﬁrm’s continuation strategy is: ﬁrm 1’s continuation strategy
16may depend on its ﬁrst-period action which is unobservable to ﬁrm 2.15 The
continuation proﬁle need not be an equilibrium and a ﬁrm 1’s continuation
payoﬀ can be even lower than the one obtained in the worst sequential
equilibrium. This implies that the link between sequential equilibrium and
admissibility of the continuation payoﬀ with respect to U is broken after
ﬁrms’ own deviations.
Assumption 1, however, allows us to avoid this problem. Indeed, as
is well known, any deviation is most eﬀectively deterred when the worst
punishment is inﬂicted, i.e., after any deviation a ﬁrm obtains its minmax
payoﬀ. Assumption 1 ensures that the minmax payoﬀ is sustained by a
reversal to the static Nash equilibrium, i.e., Σnc = ΣNash and V nc =0 ,
and thus implies that one can set the continuation payoﬀ function equal to
zero whenever the realized price e p falls outside the set of equilibrium prices
P(2q).
Consider now a symmetric equilibrium strategy where each ﬁrm makes
its actions depend only upon past signal realizations. As it is shown in
Abreu, et. al. (1986, 1990), any symmetric strategy equilibrium proﬁle can
then be factored into a single-period symmetric output q and a continuation
payoﬀ function V : R+ → R+, such that V (e p) ∈ U for any e p ∈ P and
(1 − δ)Πexp(q)+δE[V (e p(2q)] (A1)
≥ (1 − δ)πexp(z,q)+δE[V (e p(z + q))] for z ∈ S.
Using the fact that factorization (A1) holds, I can prove the following
lemma.
Lemma 1. U is compact.
Proof: Let W be an arbitrary set. We say that a pair (q,V(·)) is admis-
sible with respect to W if
(i) V (p) ∈ co(W)16 for any p ∈ [0,p max],
(ii) (A1) is satisﬁed.
Deﬁne the operator B(W) as follows:
B(W)={w ∈ R : w =( 1− δ)Πexp(q)+δE[V (e p(2q)] ,
(q,V(·)) is admissible w. r. t. W}.
According to Abreu, et. al. (1986, 1990), U is the largest bounded
invariant set generated by the operator B, i.e., U = B(U). Hence, in order
to prove compactness of U it suﬃces to show that B is compact.
15When the shock takes on two values, e p can result either from an output expansion
and the low demand state or from an output contraction and the high demand state.
16We assume that there exists a public randomization device that convexiﬁes the set W.
17Let W ⊂ R be a nonempty and compact set. Since Πexp(·) is bounded
then B(W) is also bounded.




converges to some w∞. I need to show that w∞ ∈ B(W).





sible w.r.t. W and obtains the value wk. Recall that e p(2q) ∈ { pH(2q),p L(2q)}.
Denote V k
H = V k(pH(2qk)), V k
L = V k(pL(2qk)) and wmin =m i nW and de-




l , if p = pl(2qk),l= H,L
wmin, otherwise.







straightforward to see that the pair (qk, b V k(·)) is admissible w.r.t. W and
delivers the same value wk, i.e.,













b V k(e p(z + qk))
i
.
Denote rH an output such that when the demand is high, the realized
market price corresponds to the low demand state, i.e.,
rH(q):pH(rH + q)=pL(2q).
In the same way, denote rL an output such that when the demand is
low, the realized market price corresponds to the high demand state, i.e.,
rL(q):pL(rL + q)=pH(2q).
It is easy to verify that rH(q)=2 σ + q and rL(q)=q − 2σ.Deﬁne
z∗(q) = argmax
s∈S






















18Since πexp(·) is continuos then, as (A2) implies, G(qk,Vk
H,Vk







. Similarly, since Πexp(·) is continuos then wk






































then the limit, (q∞,V∞
H ,V∞
L ) is admissible w.r.t. W. That proves w∞ ∈
B(W) and, therefore, B(W) is compact. ¥
Since U is compact then V
nc ∈ U. Consider the following strategy
Σnc(q).17
(i) At t =0produce q.
(ii) For any t ≥ 1 :p l a yΣ
nc if in the previous period the realized price
e p ∈ P(2q), otherwise play ΣNash.
Lemma 2. If the collusive output is equal to q a ts o m ep o i n to na ne q u i -
librium path then Σnc(q) is an equilibrium strategy.
Proof: Let V nc(q) denote the payoﬀ obtained from the strategy Σnc(q),
that is
V nc(q) ≡ (1 − δ)Πexp(q)+δV
nc. (A3)
In order that Σnc(q) be an equilibrium strategy, it must be immune to all
possible deviations.
Open deviations
Denote e p(z +q) ≡ a+e θ−(z +q), i.e., e p(z +q) is the realized price when
a deviating ﬁrm produces z.
In the open deviation a ﬁrm chooses z such that e p(z + q) / ∈ P(2q) and
earns πexp(z,q). Using ΣNash as the punishment, the no-open deviation con-
straint thus takes the form:
(1 − δ)[πexp(z,q) − Πexp(q)] ≤ δV
nc for any z s.t. e p(z + q) / ∈ P(2q). (A4)
Now, I show that if q satisﬁes (A1) then (A4) must hold. Indeed, (A1)
implies
17In general, one could consider strategies when, along the equilibrium paths, the actions
are contingent on the realized shocks (e.g. for h p = pH(2q) and h p = pL(2q) ﬁrms chose
diﬀerent quantities). The uniform distribution of the shocks allows us to restrict attention
on simpler strategies of the form Σ
nc(q).
19(1 − δ)[πexp(z,q) − Πexp(q)] ≤ δE[V (e p(2q)) − V (e p(z + q))] for any z.
Using the deﬁnition of V
nc and the fact that V nc =0 , one obtains
V (e p(2q)) − V (e p(z + q)) ≤ V
nc for any z.
This establishes (A4).
Hidden deviations
Two cases must be considered. First, a cheating ﬁrm may deviate by
suboptimally expanding its output production in order to mimic the price
of the low-demand state when in fact the demand is high. In which case it
produces rH(q) which solves the following equation:
pH(rH(q)+q)=pL(2q).
























The no-deviation constraint thus takes the form





Now, I show that if q satisﬁes (A1) then (A6) must hold. Indeed, (A1),
in particular, implies
(1 − δ)[πexp(rH(q),q) − Πexp(q)] ≤ δE[V (e p(2q)) − V (e p(rH(q)+q))].
Given that the shock is uniformly distributed and V (pH(rH(q)+q)) =
V (pL(2q)),o n eo b t a i n s











Thus, (A6) is established.
If a cheating ﬁrm suboptimally contracts its output in order to mimic
the high-demand when in fact the demand is low then it produces rL(q)
which solves the following equation:
20pL(q − rL(q)) = pH(2q).












Since πexp(rL(q),q) < Πexp(q), such deviations induce losses and there-
fore are never proﬁtable. ¥
The following lemma says that, without loss of generality, in searching
for the best collusive strategy one can restrict attention on studying Σnc(q)
only.
Lemma 3. The set of outputs q that can be sustained at some point on an













Proof: From lemma 2, it follows that if q is sustained at some point on










Conversely, if this condition is satisﬁed for some q then Σnc(q) is an
equilibrium strategy in which ﬁrms produce q in the ﬁrst period. Therefore,
an output q c a nb es u s t a i n e da ts o m ep o i n ti na ne q u i l i b r i u mi fa n do n l yi f
it satisﬁes (A9).
Let z∗(q) ≡ argmax
z πexp(z,q). Following lemma 2, that it can never be
z∗(q)=rL(q).N o w , i f z∗(q) 6= rH(q) then (A9) and the pair (A7)-(A8)
are clearly equivalent. If z∗(q)=rH(q) then (A8) becomes stronger than
(A7) and coincides with (A9). That proves that overall (A9) and the pair
(A7)-(A8) are equivalent.
Lastly, since the left-hand sides of (A7) and (A8) are convex functions
of q, the set of quantities satisfying both constraints is a closed interval. ¥
Deﬁne
q∗ =a r gm a x
q∈I
Πexp(q). (A10)
21The following lemma states that in searching for the most proﬁtable col-
lusive strategy, one can restrict attention to the class of stationary equilibria.
Lemma 4. Σ
nc is a stationary equilibrium strategy.
Proof: Since Σnc(q∗) is some equilibrium strategy and V
nc is the highest
equilibrium payoﬀ, then, by using (A3), one obtains
V nc(q∗)=( 1− δ)Πexp(q∗)+δV
nc ≤ V
nc,




t=0 denote the proﬁle of outputs induced by the strategy
Σ
nc.S i n c eΣ
nc is an equilibrium strategy then, according to Lemma 3, qnc
t
must satisfy (A7)-(A8) for any t. Then, from the maximization task (A10) it
follows that Πexp(q∗) ≥ Πexp(qnc
t ) for any t and, therefore, V
nc ≤ Πexp(q∗).
It h u sh a v e
V
nc ≤ Πexp(q∗) ≤ V
nc,
implying Πexp(q∗)=V
nc, which is possible only if the ﬁrms produce q∗ at
every period. Thus, the best collusive equilibrium strategy Σ
nc deﬁnes a
stationary path along which each ﬁrm produces q∗ at every point of time. ¥
Lemma 5. The maximum equilibrium payoﬀ V















nc is stationary, then the constraints in (A11) are the no-
deviation constraints to be satisﬁed along the equilibrium path. Let qnc be
the solution to program (A11). One needs to prove that qnc = q∗.
On the one hand, since V
nc is the highest equilibrium payoﬀ,t h e n
Πexp(q∗) ≤ V
nc = Πexp(qnc). On the other hand, since qnc ∈ I,t h e nf r o m
(A10) it follows that Πexp(qnc) ≤ Πexp(q∗).T h u s ,Πexp(qnc)=Πexp(q∗) and
the proof is complete. ¥
BT h eP r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1










Recall that Πexp(qnc) is the diﬀerence between the proﬁt and the static












Let us denote s = qNash− qnc. By using (A4), (B1) and (B2), I rewrite






























Notice that for any s<0 the f ICopn constraint can never be satisﬁed,
thus I consider only s ≥ 0 (which implies qnc ≤ qNash).N o w ,p r o g r a mP 1








s.t. f ICopn and f IChdn hold.
(B3)
Deﬁne S(σ) the set of s such that s ≥ 0 and the f IChdn constraint is
stronger than the f ICopn one. By comparing the left hand sides of f IChdn and


























are drawn on ﬁgure
6.





, then the solution to unconstrained
maximization of u(s,δ) is 1




Figure 6 illustrates diﬀerent positions of the graph of u(s,δ) for diﬀerent
values of δ and given that A is ﬁxed (here A is chosen such that s < 1
12A<s).
Notice that the graph of u(s,δ) shifts upward when δ rises, i.e., for any δ1, δ2
and δ3 such that δ1 <δ 2 <δ 3 one obtains u1 <u 2 <u 3 where ui = u(s,δi).
The solution, snc, to (B3) is obtained as follows. Fix a value of A,t h e n
snc is either equal to 1
12A or obtained as the point of intersection between







. Figure 6 thus shows which constraint, if any, in program
B3 is binding for given δ.
Let us deﬁne sopn(δ) and shdn(δ) as the solutions to the two no-deviation































It can be veriﬁed that sopn(δ) and shdn(δ) are continuously increasing func-
tions of δ.
Depending on the value of A, three cases are possible.











1 − 1 √
2
´A.
In this case u(s,δ) attains its maximum at the point which belongs to
the interval (s,s), as depicted on ﬁgure 6. When δ is small enough the
graph of u(s,δ) is the u1-curve which, as ﬁgure 6 shows, ﬁrst crosses the
f ICopn constraint. This implies that the solution is snc = sopn.A sl o n ga sδ
increases, the graph of u(s,δ) shifts upward. For some values of δ, it is as
depicted by the u2-curve and ﬁrst crosses the f IChdn constraint. This implies
snc = shdn.W h e nδ rises further, the graph of u(s,δ) is the u3-curve, which
in turn implies that both constraints in (B3) are slacked. The solution is
then snc = 1
12A.
Deﬁne b δ1 and b δ2 as solutions to the following equations:
b δ1 : sopn(b δ1)=shdn(b δ1)=s,




Since shdn(δ) is continuous then such b δ1 and b δ2 exist. Using the fact that
shdn(δ) is an increasing function of δ and s < 1
12A,Io b t a i nb δ1 < b δ2.
The analysis thus implies that in program B3














, and the solution to
(B3) is













By applying the same reasoning as in Case 1, I obtain snc = sopn for
small δ’s, snc = shdn for some moderate δ’s, snc = sopn for large δ’s and
snc = 1
12A when δ is very large.
Deﬁne b δ1 and b δ2 as follows18
b δ1 : sopn(b δ1)=shdn(b δ1)=s,








Since shdn(δ) and sopn(δ) are continuous then such b δ1 and b δ2 exist. Using
the fact that shdn(δ) and sopn(δ) are increasing functions of δ and s < s<
1
12A, Io b t a i nb δ1 < b δ2 < 9
17.
The analysis thus implies that in program B3



















and the solution to
(B3) is given by (B4).
Case 3. 1





1 − 1 √
2
´A.
As ﬁgure 6 shows, in this case f IChdn is never be binding and therefore
uncertainty does not impede collusion. The solution is





CT h eP r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
18Notice that b δ1 is diﬀerent in Case 2 and Case 3 because s depends on σ.











using (B1) and (B2), I rewrite the ICq and ICmeet c o n s t r a i n t sa sf o l l o w s
9
4







≤ uF(s,δ). (f ICmeet)
Notice that if s ≤ 0 then uF(s,δ) < 0 and thus the f ICq constraint
can never be satisﬁed. Therefore, I consider only s>0 (which implies
qc ≤ qNash). Now, program P3 can be stated as
Max
s uF(s,δ)
s.t. f ICq and f ICmeet hold.
(C1)
First of all, I show that the f ICmeet constraint in C1 can be omitted.





4s2}. One can verify that











Assumption 3 ensures that sF < 1
12A. Suppose now that f ICmeet in C1 is
binding for some s0 then it must be s0 <s F.S i n c euF(s,δ) is concave and
attains its maximum at the point 1










then a slight increase of s0 only weakens f ICmeet and
a tt h es a m et i m er a i s e st h ev a l u eo fuF(s,δ) in C1. Hence, it is never optimal
to have f ICmeet binding in C1.
To illustrate the solution to program C1, I refer to ﬁgure 7. Before
proceeding, note that assumption 3 ensures that there exists a non empty
set of s where uF(s,δ) > 0.
Figure 7 shows the graph of the f ICq constraint, i.e., the curve of 9
4s2,a n d
diﬀerent positions of the uF(s,δ)-curve depending on the value of δ.N o t i c e
also that uF(s,δ) is increasing with δ.
If δ is small enough then uF(s,δ) is located below 9
4s2, as depicted by
the uF1-curve. This implies that there is no s ≥ 0 such that f ICq is satisﬁed
and collusion is thus impossible.
When δ increases, uF(s,δ) shifts upward. As ﬁgure 7 makes it clear,
there exists δ0
1 such that for any δ>δ 0
1 the f ICq constraint can be satisﬁed.
δ0
1 is obtained when uF(s,δ0
1) is tangent to 9
4s2, as depicted by the uF2-curve.







26When δ rises slightly above δ0
1, the f ICq constraint in C1 becomes binding.
The graph of uF(s,δ) is the uF3-curve and the solution, sn = sq(δ) ,i s



















A further increase of δ above δ0
2 leads to the situation where the graph
of uF(s,δ) is the uF4-curve, i.e., the f ICq constraint is relaxed. In this case,
sc = 1
12A and ﬁrms can thus sustain the monopoly outcome.
Finally, δ0













One can verify that δ0
1 <δ 0
2 < 1, and the proof is complete. ¥
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